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1. Introduction 
The old (classical) theory of economic policy was the joint product of a number of authors. It 
was developed by Tinbergen in the early 1950s when he addressed, in formal terms, the issue 
of the controllability of a fixed set of independent targets for a policymaker facing a 
parametric problem (i.e. facing an economy that could be represented by a system of linear 
equations describing the given conduct of other agents). A similar approach was developed by 
Bent Hansen in the same years (see Hansen, 1958). Tinbergen’s theory however deserves the 
credit for having raised the problem of conditions for the existence of a first-best policy, i.e. a 
vector of instruments ensuring a solution to the policy problem when addressed in its simplest 
form with fixed targets. Theil (1954, 1956, 1964) then gave solutions for some of the main 
difficulties faced by this theory. He suggested that the policymaker should maximize a 
preference function subject to constraints describing the functioning of the economy, and 
arrived at a solution of the policy problem formally very similar to that predicated by Ragnar 
Frisch (Frisch, 1949, 1961).4  
After its Golden Age (from the 1950s to the mid 1970s), the classical theory of economic 
policy has been the object of fierce criticism from a number of points of view. The more 
general and forceful argument was raised by Lucas (1976), according to which a Tinbergen-
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type decision model would be inconsistent with the assumption of rational expectations. The 
importance of this contribution lies in the fact that it denies the validity of the solution given 
by Tinbergen, Theil and others, which was in the form of an (optimal) policy vector, or 
sequence of vectors that could achieve given policy targets (or get close) by assuming private 
sector behavior to be invariant to the vector itself. 
After Lucas, problems of economic policy have been dealt with in a setting consistent with 
the criticisms raised against the classical theory. The most prominent example of this setting 
was the well known Barro and Gordon (1983) contribution, which is now considered to be the 
“father” of the policy game approach. In this approach one or many public policymakers 
interact among themselves and/or with other private players (e.g. firms, unions, financial 
markets) in a strategic way. In this context, issues of the effectiveness or neutrality of specific 
policy instruments have been dealt with in specific models.  
Nevertheless, despite the widespread use of this game theory approach, general conditions for 
the (in)effectiveness of policy or equilibrium existence had never been examined. The new 
theory of economic policy emerging from the ashes of the classical one5, asserts general 
conditions for the existence of an equilibrium for the strategic interactions of the different 
players (i.e. the conditions which ensure that the optimal choices of each policymaker are 
mutually compatible), as well as the particular conditions for obtaining some specific 
properties associated with such interactions: for example, short-run fiscal or monetary policy 
neutrality or non-neutrality.  
This theory can ‘naturally’ accommodate issues of micro-foundations of macroeconomic 
relations since the strategies of the different players are the outcomes of a maximizing 
process. In this sense it is particularly suitable for the recent development of macroeconomic 
literature, where the linear-quadratic approach is predominant, even if not exclusive, through 
the log-linearization procedure. For instance, this is the case for the New Keynesian literature 
and in its recent developments which analyze the interaction between monetary and fiscal 
authorities and labor unions (see Blanchard and Galì (2005, 2006)). Further applications lie in 
the evolution of the literature about dynamic interactions among many monetary and/or fiscal 
authorities both in the new open macro-economy and in monetary union contexts;6 and in the 
application of robust control techniques to macroeconomics which can be modeled as a policy 
game between a policymaker and a fictitious evil agent.7  
This paper explicitly considers the introduction of rational expectations in the new theory of 
economic policy.8 This step is important for at least two reasons: first, because the rational 
expectations were fatal for the classical theory; and second because the rational expectations 
assumption is the usual technique for introducing the forward looking behavior of the private 
sector, a vital ingredient in the recent development of modern macroeconomic theory. We 
want to throw light on the reasons why, and under what circumstances,  we can have policy 
neutrality in a strategic context in an RE model. We will show that this neutrality property 
depends on  the relationship between the number of independent instruments and the number 
of independent targets of the players, as in models without RE. Policy neutrality therefore 
depends on this aspect of the model and the associated policy problem, rather than on its 
dynamics or the existence of rational expectations per se. 
                                                 
5 See Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2006) and Acocella et al. (2006; 2007a, 2007b). 
6 See Pappa (2004); or Aarle et al. (2006) for a survey. 
7 See, among others, Söderström (2002), Leitemo and Söderström (2004), Brock and Durlauf (2005), and 
Hansen and Sargent (2007). 
8 Indeed, the rational expectations are strictly related to the policy games since the rational expectation constraint 
emerges as a particular case of Stackelberg game. The agents that form rational expectations can be, in fact, 
considered as the game leader with respect to the action of the other agents or policymakers. 
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This paper extends the new theory of economic policy to the case where not only do the 
strategic interactions between the players respect the rational expectation assumption, the 
constraints that they face can be derived from this assumption. We also show how our 
approach can be particularly useful from the point of view of model building, in order to 
assess some qualitative aspects of models with strategic players. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the general 
framework of the theory of economic policy in a strategic and dynamic context. Section 3 
then derives the conditions for controllability of a dynamic system with rational expectations 
by a single player. Section 4 considers the corresponding conditions for the existence of 
equilibrium outcomes and policy neutrality with multiple players. Section 5 presents some 
implications of our results. Section 6 shows how our theorems can be applied to a typical 
New Keynesian model to determine the existence (and features) of the associated policy 
equilibria without the need to compute an explicit solution. Section 7 concludes and hints at 
further generalizations and applications. The appendix describes the main argument of the 
new theory in formal terms, in both a static and a dynamic context. 
 
2. The general framework 
Before specifying our policy game framework, we need to introduce some definitions, 
beginning with that for controllability. 
Definition (golden rule, controllability): A policymaker satisfies the golden rule of economic 
policy if the number of its independent instruments equals the number of its independent 
targets. This guarantees the controllability of the economic system, period by period. 
We also define policy neutrality or ineffectiveness in a policy game context as follows.9
Definition (neutrality or ineffectiveness): A policy is neutral or ineffective if the equilibrium 
values of the targets are never affected by changes in the parameters of its criterion. 
The classical definition of policy ineffectiveness – stating that autonomous changes in 
policymaker’s instruments have no influence on the targets – has been modified here to fit the 
context of a policy game, since policy instruments in the hands of others are no longer 
exogenous but endogenous variables whose values depend on the preferences of other 
decision-makers.  
Now we are ready to introduce our policy game framework. We consider a game between a 
set of “policymakers” that interact in a dynamic system which depends on past and expected 
future values of the state variables. In practice, these expectations are made by the private 
sector and may act as a constraint on the policy makers’ choices. In this paper, there are p 
policymakers grouped in the set P. Each player, i P∈ , has a set of m(i) independent policy 
instruments itx ; and a preference function defined on a subset of n(i) linearly independent 
target variables, ity , drawn from the set of all the target variables in the game: . There are a 
total of n target variables in the vector . 
ty
ty
The game is played for T periods, where T may be arbitrarily large. For the sake of simplicity, 
we will assume that  for all players and that m(i) and n(i) are constant through ( ) ( )m i n i≤
                                                 
9 See Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994). 
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time.10
Formally, the dynamics of the economy is represented by a linear difference equation with 
expectations and multiple policy makers: 
(1)  for t = 1…T, given y1 1|
i
t t t t i t
i P
y Ay By C x v− +
∈
= + + +∑ t 0 and yT+1  
where [ ]1| 1 |t t t ty E y+ += Ω  denotes the mathematical expectation of 1ty +  conditional on  (the 
common information set available to all at t) and 
tΩ
i
tx  is the vector of control variables in the 
hands of player i. The matrices A, B and Ci are constant and of order n, n, and n×m(i), 
respectively, and have at least some elements which are non-zero. In this representation, y0 is 
a known initial condition, and yT+1 is an assumed or projected terminal condition. Finally,  
is a vector of exogenous shocks and other external influences on , which have a known 
mean but otherwise come from an unspecified probability distribution. Note also that, if 
player i satisfies the golden rule and has only n(i) targets, m(i) is equal to n(i) and  (after 
deleting the rows corresponding to the non-targets in ) is a square and invertible matrix 
because the instruments are linearly independent. 
tv
ty
iC
ty
The preference or cost function that player i aims to minimize is 
(2) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2
1
, ,...
T
i p i
t t it t t
t
L x x x E y y Q y y
=
′= − −∑ i   for i P∈  
where ity  is a vector of known target values and Qit is a symmetric positive semi-definite 
matrix of weights assigned to player i’s targets in each period. For convenience we treat all 
the elements in  to be potential targets, and ty
i
ty  as defining player i’s ideal values for them 
(different perhaps from the ideal values of another player), even if player i subsequently 
chooses not to pursue n–n(i) of them (corresponding to zero rows/columns in Qit) if it turns 
out he does not have complete controllability of . Thus Qty it is of order n; but has rank n(i) ≤ 
n depending on how many variables in  turn out to be player i’s ultimate targets (i.e. have a 
preference ordering defined upon them). We assume that there are at least two players which 
share at least one target variable. However, in order to have the potential for a conflict of 
interest between them, we also assume that 
ty
i
t
j
ty y≠ ,  for the targets held in common, for all 
 in some or all periods. i P j P∈ ≠ ∈
Our representation is rather general. But we do not consider instrument variables in equation 
(2). However, to take account of the costs of using an instrument, we could simply introduce 
an additional target variable into equation (2), and an equality (static) constraint between it 
and the instrument into equation (1). That would allow us to keep instruments and targets 
formally separate. Note that a player facing instrument costs will not satisfy the golden rule 
since, in such a case, matrix  will become rectangular: . iC ( )[( ) ' : ]'i i m iC C I=%
The solution of the policy game described, if it exists, will take the form of a vector of the 
sequences: 
                                                 
10  We also discuss the case when the number of targets and instruments may vary during the game in section 
3.2. 
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(3) ( ){ } ( ){ } ( ){ }* * *1 2
1 1
, ,...,
T T
p
t t t
t i
x x x
= =
⎛ ⎞Π = ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠1
T
t=
t
. .
. .
. 0
v
v By
+ +
 
which supports , obtained by using { }* 1Tt iy y == (3) with (1) and y0 and yT+1.  
 
3. Controllability under rational expectations: The single player case 
3.1 The model in final form  
Without loss of generality, we can write the generic linear rational expectations model, in its 
reduced form for a single player, as follows:11
(4)    for t = 1…T. 1 1|
i
t t t t i ty Ay By C x v− += + + +
Because there is only one player, we omit the index i from equation (5) in this section. 
This model can now be solved from the perspective of any particular period, say t = 1, by 
putting it into its final form conditional on the information set available in that period:12
(5)    
1
1|1 1|1 1|1 0
|1 |1 |1 1|1
00 . 0 0 . . 0
: .. . 0 . . 0
: .0 . 0 . . . .
: .. . . . . 0 .
0 . 0 0 . . 0 0T T T T
y xI B C Ay
A I
B
y xA I C
−
+
−⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥−⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥−⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝
⎧ ⎫⎞⎪ ⎪⎟⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎠⎩ ⎭
 
In this representation,  is a known initial condition for t = 1; and  is an assumed or 
projected terminal condition – most probably one that describes the economic system’s long 
run equilibrium state.  
0y 1|1Ty +
It is easy to show that this final form solution always exists since the inverse matrix in (5) is 
always well defined. To see this, define the Toeplitz matrix itself to be: 
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
−
−
−
−
=
IA
B
IA
BI
TT
0.0
...
0.0
..
0.0
.  
This matrix is of order nT. Using the partitioning by time period, the determinant of  is 
given by 
TT
(6) )'0.....0,'()0.....0,(. 111 ATBIT TnT −−− −−−  
However )'0.....0,'()0.....0,( 1221 ATBITT TnTT −−−= −−−− , and so on. But .1 nIT =  Hence the 
inverse always exists by induction.  
                                                 
11 The generalization of  (1), and hence (5), to include any number of leads and lags is set out in the appendix. 
12 Hughes Hallett and Fisher (1988), Hughes Hallett et al. (1996). 
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Given that (5) always exists, we can now write the final form model in the following way: 
(7)  , or  
1|1 1|1 1|111 1
|1 |1 |11
. . .
. .. . .
. .. . .
. .. . .
. . .
T
T TT TT
y xR R
y xR R
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎡ ⎤⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎢ ⎥= +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝
.
.
.
T
b
b
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
1|1
|1
(8)  bRxy +=
where  , and denotes the 
Kronecker product. In this representation of the model, each 
),(1 CITR T ⊗= − 1 1 0{ ( | ) ( ' : 0) ' (0 : ') ' }T Tb T E v A y B y− += Ω + + ⊗
, |1 /t j t jR y x= ∂ ∂  is an n×m 
matrix of policy multipliers for t, j = 1…T. But notice that 0, ≠jtR  even if t < j. Hence 
equation (8) implies  is a matrix of conventional policy multipliers between  andjtR , |1ty |1jx , 
with a delay of t – j between implementation and realization if t ≥ j (i.e. causality runs 
forwards). But represents a matrix of anticipatory effects, onjtR , |1ty , of an announced or 
anticipated policy change |1jx at some point in the future if t < j.
13
3.2 Multi-period static controllability 
Static (or Tinbergen) controllability defines the set of conditions which must hold if an 
arbitrary set of target values can be achieved for the endogenous variables  in each period – 
at least in expectation given that the original model is stochastic. Define those target values to 
be 
ty
|1ty , where the bar denotes desired values from the perspective of period 1, and y to be the 
corresponding stacked vector of desired values for all time periods.  
Static controllability evidently now requires the matrix R in (8) to possess an inverse: 
(9) 1( )x R y b−= −   
where y, x and b are all understood to be expectations conditioned on the current information 
set , as specified in (8). Hence: tΩ
Theorem 1: Under rational expectations static controllability by a single player, as in a 
conventional backwards looking model, requires as many independent policy instruments as 
there are target variables in each time period.  
Proof: From (8),  whereTT CTR
1−= CIC TT ⊗= . Hence  exists if 
and only if exists, since we already know that always exists. But the 
instrument coefficient matrix, C, can only possess an inverse if n = m and it has full rank: i.e. 
has rows and columns that are linearly independent. But those are also the conditions which 
provide period-by-period static controllability in a conventional backwards looking model, 
whether static (A = 0, B = 0) or dynamic (B = 0, A ≠ 0).■ 
TTTTT TCCTR
1111 )( −−−− ==
11 −− ⊗= CIC TT 1−TT
 
Corollary 1: Theorem 1 assumes that the same number of targets and instruments will be 
                                                 
13 As a result, a conventional “backwards looking” model will have =0 for all t < j; and constant multi-
pliers  for t – j = 0...T – 1, if the model at (5) is linear. Neither of these things is true in (8). 
,t jR
,t j t jR R −=
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used in each time period since the matrix inverse of  is of order nT TR × mT. But if that is not 
the case, then we need  in each period if static controllability is to hold across the 
whole policy interval since  now becomes . The sufficient condition, 
in terms of linear independence in , cannot be inferred from R in this case. Similarly, if 
policy makers wish to pursue only n(i) targets, we can delete the n–n(i) rows corresponding to 
the non-targets in (8). Once again we need 
tt mn =
1−⊗CI }{ 11 −− = tT CdiagC
TC
tt min =)(  for static controllability. 
 
Comments: 
i) Theorem 1 implies that there is no change to the static controllability conditions in a 
parametric context, when there are rational or forward looking expectations. As always n = m, 
well-known as the Tinbergen theorem, is a necessary condition for static controllability. The 
sufficient condition is linear independence in the impact of the instruments on the targets 
(together with n = m). This is the conventional case discussed in Hughes Hallett (1989). 
ii) In the event that we have surplus instruments, m > n, then we may transfer m–n of them 
from |1tx , times their coefficients from C, to the corresponding element of  in (6) before 
proceeding with theorem 1 on the reduced system. 
|1tv
iii) The conditions which provide multi-period static controllability in a conventional model 
go through unchanged in a model with rational/forward looking expectations. Theorem 1 
therefore shows that there is a range of circumstances in which time inconsistency and the 
Lucas critique actually do not apply, despite market participants having fully forward looking 
expectations. Thus controllability, when it exists, allows agents to know that those actions 
will be undertaken since the policy makers cannot improve on them. 
 
4. Policy games and the golden rule: The existence of equilibria and policy neutrality 
with multiple players 
Given the above framework, we reintroduce the possibility of multiple policy makers whose 
decisions may interact. Two new theorems can be derived, which relate to the existence of the 
Nash equilibrium and the effectiveness of the players’ policies. 
Theorem 2 (non-existence): No Nash Equilibrium exists for the policy game described if at 
least two players having in common at least one target variable satisfy the golden rule, unless 
they share the same target values.  
Proof. Assume that a solution (3) to the policy game exists. By focusing on player i, we can 
rewrite equation (1) as:  
(10)  for   t = 1…T 1 1|
i
t t t t i ty Ay By C x K− += + + + it
where 
|
i
it j t t
j N i
K C x v∗
∈
= ∑ +  captures the effect of other players’ decisions, and external events, 
on each target variable. Equation (10) can now be put into its final form conditional on the 
common information set available in the initial period, 1Ω , as follows: 
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(11) 
1
1|1 1|11|1 0
|1 |1|1
00 . . 00 . 0
: .0 . . .. . 0
: .. . . .0 . 0 .
: .. . 0 .. . . .
0 . . 00 . 0 0
i
ii
i
T iT Ti T
y KC xI B Ay
A I
B
y KC xA I
−
+
⎛ ⎞−⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥− ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥− ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ 1|1
.
.
0
By
+ +
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
 
As before, this final form solution always exists since the inverse in (11) is well defined. To 
see that, note that the Toeplitz matrix is exactly the same as that in (6). Hence the inverse 
matrix in (11) always exists.   
Given that the inverse of TT always exists, we can rewrite (11) as follows: 
(12) 
1|1 1|111 1 1|1
|1 |11 |1
. . .
. .. . . .
. .. . . .
. .. . . .
. . .
i
ii i T
i
T iT
y
iT iTT T
bR R x
y bR R x
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥= +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
i
i iy R x b,     or     +   =
where 1i T iTR T C
−= 1 1 0 1|1{ ( | ) ( : 0) (0 : ) }i T i Tb T E K A y B y− +′ ′ ′ ′= Ω + +, , and where . If 
player i satisfies the golden rule, the instrument coefficient matrix, C
iT iC I C= ⊗
i, can be inverted. If Ci 
can be inverted, CiT can also be inverted. Hence, if player i satisfies the golden rule, Ri can be 
inverted too. 
Theorem 2 gives a necessary condition for the existence of a policy equilibrium since it states 
a sufficient condition for non-existence. But it may be not sufficient for the existence of a 
policy equilibrium. For example, if player j satisfies the golden rule, his/her optimal strategy 
must satisfy  
(13) 1(i ii )ix R y b
−= −  where 1 2: : ... :i i i iTy y y y ′⎡ ⎤′ ′ ′= ⎣ ⎦  
which implies: 
(14) iy y=  
From equation (14) it clearly follows: 
(15) |1
i
t ty y=   for  1...t T=
Now assume that player k also satisfies the golden rule. It would then follow that: 
(16) |1
k
t ty y=   for  1...t T=
However, the realized values of the target variables, at least in period 1, implied by equations 
(15) and (16) cannot be mutually satisfied and, therefore, no equilibrium can exist.■ 
Hence, as a corollary from the previous theorem, we can also state: 
Theorem 3 (ineffectiveness): If one (and only one) player satisfies the golden rule, all the 
other players’ policies are ineffective with respect to the targets shared with the first player. 
Proof: Obvious from theorem 2, since (15)-(16) would otherwise follow where it
k
ty y≠ in at 
least one element.■ 
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Comments: 
i) Theorem 3 gives a sufficient condition for policy ineffectiveness, but this does not assure 
the existence of an equilibrium, which may fail to occur. Theorem 2 gives a necessary 
condition for an equilibrium to exist because it states a sufficient condition for the opposite. 
Note that, if Theorem 3 is satisfied, Theorem 2 is not (and vice versa). This follows directly 
from the words in brackets in Theorem 3.  
ii) In the Nash equilibrium, the optimal policy of each player is such as to minimize its 
preference function given the equilibrium policies of all the other players. In the open-loop 
solution, this is required in the initial period; whereas in the feedback case the condition must 
be satisfied in all periods. 
 
5. Some implications of our results 
5.1 Equilibrium existence and the instrument costs 
It is useful to compare our results to a well-known theorem of existence of Nash equilibrium, 
i.e. Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), which relates the existence to the costs of the instruments 
since, in a similar manner, we have expressed the necessary condition for the existence in 
terms of an instruments/targets counting rule.  
Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) in fact show that a sufficient condition for the Nash equilibrium 
existence is that the space of strategies of each player is convex and compact. If players’ 
controls are unbounded, the Nash equilibrium may not exist. In static linear quadratic games, 
the introduction of quadratic instrument costs would make them bounded, thus assuring the 
existence of the equilibrium.   
In our terms, the introduction of quadratic instrument costs would imply that the dimensions 
of matrices Ci become  as noted in section 2. The number of instruments 
would then always be less than that of targets, the system would be not controllable by any 
player and the equilibrium would exist. From this point of view, our theorem 2 is useful, in 
that it displays the features of the game when it is not affected by the insertion of instrument 
costs. Instrument costs can alter the results and may appear to be an ad hoc assumption 
designed to confer different – and perhaps more appealing – features on the game. As we have 
it, a situation with instrument costs is just a special case.
( ( ) ( )) ( )n i m i m i+ ×
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5.2 Model building and the golden rule 
Theorems 2 and 3 presented above state the conditions for the consistency of the optimal 
strategies of all the players (and thus the existence of the equilibrium of the policy game) as 
well as the effectiveness of policy instruments. Their importance lies in that similar 
statements and conditions appear to be essential for model building both from an analytical 
and a policy perspective. From the former, it is interesting to know whether a specific model 
displays such an important feature as that of the existence of at least one equilibrium. From 
the latter, one should be able to understand the role of the different policymakers and their 
ability to have an influence (whether exclusive or joint with other players) on their target 
variables.   
5.3 Dynamic controllability 
                                                 
14 Section 2 shows this explicitly. 
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A natural question, at this point, is to ask whether these results also extend to the concept of 
dynamic controllability (for which the reader is referred to Preston and Pagan, 1982, ch.8, or 
Holly and Hughes Hallett, 1989, ch.2). That is, do the usual conditions defining dynamic 
controllability also carry over to an economy subject to rational expectations and forward 
looking behavior? Or are they amended in some substantive way which is not apparent from a 
consideration of the static controllability case?   
The answer is yes, they are significantly modified and in at least three different directions. 
First, in the presence of rational expectations, the policy authorities can use the possibility of 
announcements of future policy changes to help steer their policy targets towards their desired 
values (a possibility that has received some attention in the context of whether Central Banks 
should make explicit or implicit interest rate forecasts; Rudebusch and Williams, 2006). This, 
in effect, increases the degree of controllability and hence reduces the point at which full 
controllability can be achieved. But, against that, the interaction between the players can  
complicate the outcomes in two different ways. First, if they are sufficiently strong, those 
interactions may extend the period needed to achieve full controllability by one or other 
player, as each player struggles to offset the actions undertaken by the other in each time 
period. Ultimately they may destroy controllability altogether if there is no equilibrium to the 
game. Second, they may influence the stability of the transition path to the desired targets. If 
that happens, and the player with dynamic controllability finds that transition path 
unacceptable, he may have to modify his policies and delay full controllability (with the result 
that his policies will appear less effective without the other policies having become more 
effective).  
These three new features are important, and are sufficiently complicated to require a separate 
paper to examine them in the required detail: see Acocella et al. (2007b). Moreover, there is 
an important advantage in separating dynamic from static controllability, as section 4 and the 
examples in section 6 make clear. Using static controllability in a multi-period dynamic 
setting allows us to focus on the conditions which control the existence of the eventual 
equilibrium and possible policy neutrality/ineffectiveness, as distinct from those which affect 
controllability along the way. We deal with issues of controllability in a steady state (or multi-
period certainty equivalent) sense here; and those in the conventional dynamic sense in the 
companion paper. 
 
6. Examples:  
a) A simple New Keynesian model with policy interactions 
To illustrate the usefulness of our results we take a simple model with fiscal and monetary 
interactions, and examine the conditions under which the equilibrium may exist and cannot  
exist. For the sake of transparency, we work in two stages: first we analyze the case in which 
there are forward looking expectations but no inertia, and then the case where there are 
backwards looking dynamics as well. We do this to expose all the elements in the optimal 
policy reaction functions; these can be seen explicitly in (24) and (25) below for the first case, 
but the corresponding reaction functions for the second case are too complicated to give the 
same insight. That makes our case: it is easier to check non-existence using our targets-
instruments approach, than it is to compute the equilibrium directly. Note however that our 
tests rule out equilibria that do not exist (necessary conditions). Of the remainder which may 
exist, we can be sure that they do exist because it is easy to check directly from the model, 
(21) below, that the sub-matrices of are such that is then non-singular (sufficiency). TR TR
Consider a simple economy with a New Keynesian structure: 
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(17) ( ) 1 11t t t t t t tE x fπ λ β π λπ κ φ+ −= − + + + + v  
(18) ( )1 1t t t t t t tx E x i E f tσ π χ+ += − − + + ε  
(19) tε  white noise. 
(20)  white noise. tv
where tπ is the inflation rate, tx  is the output gap relative to a non-market clearing trend or a 
natural rate of output arising from monopolistic competition in the goods markets (Blanchard 
and Kiyotaki, 1987); or from tax distortions elsewhere in the economy (Alesina and Tabellini, 
1987); tf is some kind of fiscal policy instrument;  is the nominal interest rate. We assume a 
large value of T, so that the dynamic effects of any external shocks will have been absorbed 
before the policy exercise is complete. 
ti
This model has the following reduced form 
(21) 
1
1 1
1 1
1 (1 ) 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1
t t t
t t
t t t
v
E f
x x x
π π πκ λ β λ φ σ tt
t
i εσ χ
−
+ −
+ −
⎧ ⎫− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪= + +⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
− +  
The monetary authority’s (central bank) loss is 
(22) 2 2
1
1
2
T
t
t B t
t
B E x B tβ α η π
=
⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦∑  
The fiscal authority’s (government) loss function is: 
(23) ( )2 2
1
1
2
T
t
t G t G
t
G E x k tβ α η
=
π⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦∑ . 
Obviously enough, the monetary authority controls , whereas ti tf  is the government’s 
control. This model is simple enough to solve for its equilibrium outcomes explicitly, when 
that equilibrium exists. To ensure tractability, however, we will consider the case without 
inertia (i.e. with purely forward looking behavior): λ = 0.  
In the discretionary equilibrium, the optimal fiscal policy is: 
(24)  12 2 2 2
( ( )) ( ( )( )) ( )
( ) ( )
G t G G t
t
G G G G
Ef αχ κη κχ φ ε α χσ η κχ φ κσ β πα χ η κχ φ α χ η κχ φ
++ + + + += − − ++ + + +  
1
2 2 2 2 2 2
( ( )) ( ( ))
( ) ( ) ( )
G G t G G t G
G G G G G G
Ex iα χ κη κχ φ σ α χ κη κχ φ α χκ
α χ η κχ φ α χ η κχ φ α χ η κχ φ
++ + + +− + ++ + + + + +  
and the optimal monetary policy is: 
(25)  
2 2
1 1
2 2
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
t B B B t B B B t t
t
B B B B
E fi ε η κβ α σ η κ σ π α χ η κ χ η κφ Exσ σ α η κ σ α η κ σ
+ ++ + + += + + ++ +  
By imposing the rational expectation constraint, we can obtain the Markov Nash equilibrium 
results as: 
(26)  
2( (
( ( ) )
t G B B
t
B G G B
ki ε α χ χη κ α βχ σφ χσ α η κχ φ α χη κ φσ
+ − + += + + −
))
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(27)  
2( )
( ( )
B B B G
t
B G G B
kf
)
βα α η κ α χ
φ α η κχ φ α χη κ
− + += + −  
(28)  
( )
B G
t
G B B G
kx κη α χα χη κ α η κχ φ= − − + +  
(29)  
( )
B G
t
G B B G
kα α χπ α χη κ α η κχ φ= − + +  
which are already fairly complicated expressions to analyze. In fact, without computing limits 
for particular values of the parameters, or for combinations of zero restrictions on the α and η 
parameters, it is not immediately obvious from (26) to (29) when a policy equilibrium or 
equilibrium outcomes do not exist; or when one player will find that he has no influence over 
that part of the solution of particular concern to him. On the other hand, it would be extremely 
easy to ascertain the existence of policy equilibrium and/or policy neutrality by simply using 
our theorems. For conciseness’ sake we do not perform this task here, but apply our theorems 
to a more complex case in which there are both rational expectations and inertia.  
b) A more general, but more complicated case. 
We now consider a more complex example with policy inertia: 
(30) ( ) ( )2 2
1
1
2
T
t
t t B t B B t B
t
B E x xβ α η π π
=
⎡ ⎤= − + −⎣ ⎦∑  
(31) ( ) ( )2 2
1
1
2
T
t
t t G t G G t G
t
G E x xβ α η π π
=
⎡ ⎤= − + −⎣ ⎦∑  
(32) ( ) 1 11t t t t t t tE x fπ λ β π λπ κ φ+ −= − + + + + v  
(33) ( )1 1t t t t t t tx E x i E f tσ π χ+ += − − + + ε  
(34) tε  realization from stochastic process of a known distribution. 
(35)  realization from stochastic process of a known distribution. tv
Note that we have two independent target variables here (inflation and output) with, by 
assumption, two mutually inconsistent sets of target values across the players: B Gx x≠  
and B Gπ π≠ . And this time, there is no need to impose the additional restriction of λ = 0. 
As before, the model’s reduced form solution demonstrates the independence of the 
instruments (sufficiency): 
(36) 
1
1 1
1 1
1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1
t t t
t t
t t t
v
E f
x x x
π π πκ λ λ φ σ tt
t
i εσ χ
−
+ −
+ −
⎧ ⎫− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪= + + −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
+  
Thus, and without the need to compute an explicit solution, the model’s policy equilibria can 
be summarized as follows by using our theorems and target-instrument counting rules. 
 
Table 1 – A complete taxonomy 
Game: Real output gap:  Inflation rate: 
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1. , , , ≠ 0 Both authorities affect output Both authorities affect inflation Ba Bh Ga Gh
2.  Both authorities affect output 0Ba = Bp p=  
3.  0Bh = Bx x=     Both authorities affect inflation 
4.  Both authorities affect output 0Ga = Gp p=  
5.  0Gh = Gx x=     Both authorities affect inflation 
6.  and a          The equilibrium does not exist  0Ba = = 0G
7.  and          The equilibrium does not exist 0Bh = 0Gh =
8.  and  0Ba = 0Gh = Gx x=     Bp p=  
9.  and  0Bh = 0Ga = Bx x=     Gp p=  
 
Hence the value of our results is that they allow us to determine a) when an equilibrium does 
not exist; and b) who will find that their policies are ineffective, if it exists. 
In support of table 1, it is important to note that some of the cases identified are unlikely to be 
encountered in practice. But many of them are cases that we deal with in the literature every 
day – including those where an equilibrium does not exist, or where one player finds his 
policies to be ineffective and therefore subject to time inconsistency by others. Case 1, “no 
overall control”, is evidently the most general specification. But the literature on independent 
and conservative central banks fits into case 2: the central bank targets low inflation 
exclusively. Cases 3 and 4, with the reverse assignments, appear unlikely. 
Cases 6 and 7, where the equilibrium outcomes do not exist, are perhaps the most interesting. 
Case 6 is where both policy authorities agree that inflation is the overriding problem, albeit 
with differing target values or priorities (Europe in the 1980s; US in the 1970s, South 
America post-1950; Germany in the 1920s). Likewise, case 7 is the case where both agree 
that recession/depression is the main problem (Japan in the 1990s, the United States and 
Europe in the 1930s and in 2001-3). The last two examples then define policy assignments 
that “decouple” the policy problem into two separate components. Case 8 has monetary policy 
assigned to inflation control, and fiscal policy to output stabilization – a textbook paradigm 
often used by policy makers. For example, the Euro-area is predicated on governments being 
concerned only with output stabilization since, by statute, they can have no influence on the 
common monetary policy15, while the ECB is designed to focus on inflation control 
lexicographically over output stabilization. Finally, case 9 has the reverse assignment 
(sometimes discussed in the context of exchange rate targeting). 
c) The role of instrument costs: a further extension 
Adding instrument costs produces the following economic model 
(37) ( ) ( )2 2 2
1
1
2
T
t
t t B t B B t B B t
t
B E x xβ α η π π θ
=
s⎡ ⎤= − + − +⎣ ⎦∑  
                                                 
15 However, being unable to influence inflation directly (they have no instrument assigned to that target) does not 
mean that their actions do not affect inflation or that they do not account for inflation when setting fiscal policy. 
They do affect inflation, and take that into account, because of the spillovers from the actions induced in their 
opponent: see the second term in (24). 
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(38) ( ) ( )2 2 2
1
1
2
T
t
t t G t G G t G G t
t
G E x x bβ α η π π θ
=
⎡ ⎤= − + − +⎣ ⎦∑  
(39) ( ) 1 11t t t t t t tE x fπ λ β π λπ κ φ+ −= − + + + + v
t
 
(40) ( )1t t t t t t tx E x i E fσ π χ+= − − + + ε  
(41)  t ts i=
(42)  t tb f=
Now the equilibrium always exists, because no player can control the system, unless we have 
the two cases in which the policy problem separates into two parts: ( , ) and 
( , ). But in these two cases, where both players care only about their own 
controls and both can control their own subsystems, the equilibrium will again exist since 
there are no shared target variables between the players. But it is not one in which the players 
can get exactly what they want. 
0Ga = 0Bh =
0Ba = 0Gh =
 
7. Concluding remarks 
This paper generalizes the results of the new theory of economic policy to the case of policy 
games in a dynamic setting with rational expectations for future behavior. 
The importance of the new theory of economic policy lies first in the fact that it settles an old 
issue (policy controllability) in the only setting (policy games) in which it can be consistently 
placed to overcome the Lucas critique. In addition, it does so by returning to the propositions 
of the classical theory, which is of interest from the point of view of the history of economic 
thought. Third and more importantly, its two fundamental propositions appear to be essential 
for model building, since they state the conditions for the consistency of the optimal strategies 
of all the players (and thus the existence of the equilibrium of the game) as well as for the 
effectiveness of policy instruments. 
Our paper has analyzed the problems that can arise in a policy game with a dynamic setting 
and rational expectations about future behavior. We have stated the relationship between the 
static controllability (the well-known Tinbergen golden rule) and the existence of a Nash 
equilibrium, as well as the particular conditions for obtaining some specific properties 
associated with the strategic interactions: for example, short-run fiscal or monetary policy 
neutrality or non-neutrality. With reference to a standard New Keynesian model, we have 
shown how to determine the existence of equilibrium outcomes; the conditions under which 
no equilibrium exists; and who gets to dominate (or equivalently, who will find their policies 
to have become ineffective) in those equilibria, without having to compute all the possible 
equilibria directly. 
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Appendix: A generalization to multiple leads and lags 
 
We now consider a general linear rational expectations model, with p lags and q lead or 
expectations terms. This can be converted to a first order model, such as in (1), as follows. 
The (p, q) model is of the form: 
(A1)                    t = 1…T   1 /( ) ( )
i
t t t t i t
i P
y A L y B L y C x v−
∈
= + +∑ t+
where   with pp LALALAALA ++++= ....)( 2210 00 =A ; 
and -1 -10 1( ) = + +........+
-q
qB L B B L B L   with = 0; 0B
are both polynomials in the lag operator .1−= tt yLy  In such a model, we can always rewrite 
(A1) by stacking the variables as follows: 
(A2) .        
1 2 /
1 1/1 1
1 2
0 . . . 0 0 0 . 0
. . .. 0 . . 0 . . 0 0
. . . . . 0
. . .. 0 . 0 0 . . . 0
0 . 0 0 0 . . . 0
t q t q t q t
i
t t t t i tp q
i P
t p t p t p
y y yI
I
y y y C x vA A B B
I
y y yI
+ − + − +
− +
∈
− + − − +
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
∑ t+ +
t
Or, in obvious notation, 
(A3)         1 1/
i
t t t t i t
i P
y Ay By C x v− +
∈
= + + +∑% %% %
which is in exactly the same form as the model at (1) of the main text. 
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